Scientific knowledge does not simply circulate. It is shaped by institutions, values, and social relations, and continually contested in public life. From vaccine hesitancy to debates about misinformation, public disagreement over science is often treated as a problem of ignorance or irrationality. My research challenges this view.
I study how scientific and medical knowledge functions in contexts of persistent disagreement, with a focus on trust, expertise, and credibility. Rather than locating epistemic failure in individuals, my work examines the institutional and social conditions under which knowledge is produced, communicated, and taken to be authoritative.
My current research develops a framework of epistemic governance, the structures through which societies organize scientific knowledge, assign credibility, and manage disagreement. This framework integrates my earlier work on evidence-based medicine, public trust, expertise, and misinformation into a unified account of how scientific authority operates and how it can fail in democratic social contexts.
About Me
I am Professor of Philosophy at the University of Guelph, working across philosophy of science, philosophy of medicine, and social epistemology.
